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Abstract
We study the effects of ‘balance billing’, i.e., allowing physicians to charge a fee from patients in addition to the
fee paid by Medicare. First, we show that on pure efficiency grounds the optimal Medicare fee under balance
billing is zero. An active Medicare policy thus can only be justified when distributional concerns are accounted for.
Extending the analysis by Glazer and McGuire, we therefore analyze the optimal policy from the patients’ point of
view. We demonstrate that, from the patients’ perspective, a positive fee can be superior under balance billing.
Furthermore, patient welfare can be lower if balance billing is prohibited. In particular, this is the case if the
administrative costs of Medicare are large. However, we cannot rule out that prohibiting balance billing may be
superior. Finally, we show that payer fee discrimination increases patient welfare if Medicare’s administrative costs
are high or if Medicare’s optimal fee under balance billing implies lower quality for fee-only patients.
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1 Introduction
The US Medicare program allows doctors to ‘balance
bill’ patients, i.e., to charge them a price in addition to
the Medicare payment. In the late 80s and early 90s,
state and federal legislation was introduced to restrict
this practice. Additional prices are now limited to about
10% of the Medicare fee.(endnote a) In a theoretical
study, Glazer and McGuire have shown that these
restrictions on balance billing come at a price as doctors
have an incentive to reduce the quality of their services
[1]. Strikingly, prohibiting balance billing reduces quality
for all patients, regardless of whether they pay a balance
bill. From an efficiency point of view, they demonstrate
that allowing balance billing always leads to superior
results if the Medicare fee is set appropriately.
A limitation of the analysis by Glazer and McGuire is
that they focus exclusively on the efficiency aspects of
balance billing. An important concern, however, is that
patients are worse off if physicians are allowed to bal-
ance bill. In particular, previous work by Paringer,
Mitchell and Cromwell as well as Zuckerman and Hola-
han has shown that allowing physicians to charge extra
fees may only increase the rents of physicians at the
expense of patients [2-4]. These papers, however, do not
consider effects on quality. Taking into account
efficiency gains from balance billing, this raises the
question on how these gains are shared between
patients and physicians.
In this paper, we take the analysis of Glazer and
McGuire further and focus on the welfare of patients.
We analyze the optimal Medicare fee both from a pure
efficiency perspective and from the patients’ point of
view. Furthermore, we reexamine the case for prohibit-
ing balance billing and consider the effects on patient
welfare if Medicare discriminates the fee depending on
whether the physician treats the patient at the fee only
or charges a balance bill.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we dis-
cuss the literature. Section 3 reviews the analysis by Gla-
zer and McGuire. In Section 4, we determine the
optimal Medicare fee under balance billing using the
social surplus function of Glazer and McGuire. Section
5 analyzes the implications of Medicare’s policy on
patient welfare. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Review of the literature
Most of the theoretical studies on balance billing
assume a monopolistic physician who faces a down-
ward-sloping demand curve [2]-[4]. Within this frame-
work, the effects on the quantity of services supplied by
the physician has been explored. The physician is able
to price discriminate, requiring patients with a high will-
ingness to pay a balance bill. If the physician also
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accepts fee-only patients under balance billing, then pro-
hibiting balance billing leaves the quantity of supply
unchanged since only inframarginal patients are balance
billed. Only the physician’s rent is reduced. However, if
doctors refuse to treat fee-only patients under balance
billing, then prohibiting balance billing reduces the
number of patients treated.
How Medicare’s balance billing policy affects the
incentives for a monopolistic physician to set quality of
treatment is analyzed by Feldman and Sloan as well as
Wedig, Mitchell and Cromwell [5,6]. Both papers
assume that the physician is not able to price or quality
discriminate. Feldman and Sloan show that it is uncer-
tain whether price controls, i.e., prohibiting balance bill-
ing, increase welfare. Wedig et al., however, find a case
for price controls if health insurance shifts the demand
curve to the right and physicians react by increasing
quantity and quality beyond the social optimum.
All the models presented do not include competition
among physicians. Furthermore, neither Feldman and
Sloan nor Wedig et al. consider price and quality discri-
mination. However, these factors are highly relevant in
the context of balance billing. First, Medicare’s fee pol-
icy affects the degree of competition between physicians.
Second, balance billed patients are likely to receive
higher quality than fee-only patients. Both factors are
incorporated in the model by Glazer and McGuire.
They show that physicians have an incentive to save
costs by reducing quality for Medicare patients. To
patients who pay a balance bill, however, they will pro-
vide the efficient quality level. Their main result is that
by setting fees correctly, efficiency is higher if balance
billing is allowed.
An empirical study of the effects of Medicare restric-
tions on balance billing in late 80s and early 90s has
been performed by McKnight [7]. She finds that these
reduced out-of-pocket medical expenditure of Medicare
beneficiaries by 9%. With the exception of a significant
fall in the number of follow-up telephone calls, her
study shows little evidence that physicians changed their
behavior in response to the balance billing restrictions.
3 The analysis by Glazer and McGuire
3.1 The model
In the model by Glazer and McGuire, patients demand
one unit of service per period and are uniformly distrib-
uted on a line segment of length one. The two physi-
cians are situated at the end points of this segment. A
patient’s distance from a physician captures the product
differentiation which implies that each supplier faces a
downward-sloping demand curve. It serves as a geo-
graphic metaphor for patients’ preferences for treatment.
Demand results endogenously from the benefit
U¯ − t − s that a patient with distance t from the
physician (0 ≤ t ≤ 1) derives from a service of quality s,
where higher values of s indicate a lower level of quality.
Medicare sets the fee f for a unit of service. In addition,
physicians may ask certain patients to pay a price p.
(endnote b) Assuming symmetric information about the
patients’ willingness to pay, physicians will ask the price
p from the patients situated close to them (as they have
a high willingness to pay) and renounce on it for the
others. This market segmentation is enforceable as phy-
sician services cannot be traded. Physicians also choose
the quality offered to price-paying and fee-only patients.
Apart from affecting demand, quality increases costs.
For a given quality, marginal cost is constant and equals
c for s = 0. Quality reductions result in positive but
diminishing cost savings v(s) with v(0) = 0, v’ > 0 and v″
< 0.
Glazer and McGuire show that a profit maximizing
physician always sets the service quality for the price-
paying patients on the efficient level determined by
v’(s*) = 1. This is due to the additive specification of the
utility U(p, t, s) = U¯ − p − t − s that a price-paying
patient with distance t from the physician draws from a
service of quality s. A one unit increase in the price has
the same impact on the patient as a quality reduction
(increase of s) by one unit. The physician’s profit from
serving a patient is π(p, s) = p + f - c + v(s). For v’(s) >
1, the physician can thus decrease the price by one and
in return increase s by a unit. While the patient’s utility
is unaffected, her profit rises. An analogous argument
rules out quality levels s with v’(s) < 1. Because social
surplus from a unit of service
U(p, t, s) + π(p, s) − f = U¯ − t − s − c + v(s) is maximal if
quality is such that v’(s*) = 1, price-paying patients
always receive the socially efficient level of quality, inde-
pendently from Medicare’s fee policy f. For this reason
s* can be normalized to 0 and we have v’(0) = 1. s then
measures the quality difference to the fee-only patients.
3.2 Market equilibrium
With the above assumptions, the physicians’ demand
functions can be derived. Let t∗i denote the total number
of patients served by physician i. For each of them, she
is paid f by Medicare. Patients with a high willingness to
pay due to their short distance (and their long distance
from the competitor) are asked to pay the price pi in
addition. Their number is denoted by t˜i. They receive
the constant quality s = 0, whereas si is the quality
offered by i to her fee-only patients.
When discriminating patients, physicians’ are limited
by their patients’ option to go to the other physician.
They will only be willing to pay pi if this is superior to
seeking treatment from the other physician with quality
sj at the fee only. For the indifferent price-paying patient
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with distance t˜i from physician i the equality
U¯ − t˜i − pi = U¯ − (1 − t˜i) − sj must hold.(endnote c) The
number of patients from which physician i asks to pay
pi is thus given by
t˜i =
1 − pi + sj
2
. (1)
This shows that the discrimination rule of physicians
is based on an endogenous limit between fee-only and
balance-billed patients.
Analogously, the total number of i’s patients follows
from the indifference U¯ − t∗i − si = U¯ − (1 − t∗i ) − sj and
is
t∗i =
1 − si + sj
2
. (2)
Thus, the number of i’s fee-only patients amounts to
tˆi = t∗i − t˜i =
pi − si
2
. (3)
Using (1) and (3), physician i’s profit can be written as
a function of her strategy vector (pi, si) and of her com-
petitor’s one:
π i(pi, si, sj) = (pi + f − c)t˜i + (f − c + v(si))tˆi
=
pi(1 − pi + sj)
2
+ (f − c)1 − si + sj
2
+ v(si)
pi − si
2
.
The market equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium of the
complete information game where
1. the two physicians simultaneously choose the
price p for the price-paying and the quality s for the
fee-only patients, and
2. each patient chooses one physician.
This market equilibrium yields an endogenous number
of balanced-billed patients
(t˜1 + t˜2 = (1 − p1 − p2 + s1 + s2)/2) and fee-only patients
(1 − t˜1 − t˜2).
The necessary conditions for such an equilibrium are
given by
∂π i/∂pi = [1 − 2pi + sj + v(si)]/2 = 0 (4)
∂π i/∂si = [−(f − c) + v′(si)(pi − si) − v(si)]/2 = 0. (5)
Assuming that the second-order conditions are met,
Glazer and McGuire confine their analysis to symmetric
and stable equilibria (see Figure 1), whereby stability
requires the slope of the reaction functions in the equili-
brium to be smaller than one. This implies for si = sj = s
and pi = pj = p
∂si/∂sj < 1 ⇔ v′′(s)(1 − s + v(s)) − 3v′(s) + (v′(s))2 < 0.(endnote d) (6)
Based on this condition, it is possible to show that in
the symmetric Nash equilibrium quality increases with
the fee f. Accounting for symmetry, (4) and (5) can be
rewritten as
1 − 2p + s + v(s) = 0 (7)
−(f − c) + v′(s)(p − s) − v(s) = 0. (8)
Substituting p = (1 + s + v(s))/2 from (7) in (8) yields
v′(s)(1 + v(s) − s) − 2v(s) = 2(f − c). (9)
By implicit differentiation of (9),
ds
df
=
2
v′′(s)(1 − s + v(s)) − 3v′(s) + (v′(s))2 < 0 (10)
because of (6). Physicians compensate for the lower
fee by cost savings from reduced quality for the fee-only
patients. Furthermore note that (7) implies
dp
df
=
s + v′(s)
2
ds
df
< 0
i.e., physicians reduce the price for higher quality if
Medicare raises its fee.
3.3 Welfare analysis based on efficiency
In the symmetric market equilibrium, both the quality s
for the fee-only patients and the price p for the price-
payers depend on the fee f (cf. conditions (7) and (8)).
The model can therefore be used to characterize the
Physician 1 Physician 2
t∗1 t
∗
2
t˜∗1 t˜
∗
2
1/2
Figure 1 Symmetric equilibrium in the market for physician services.
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socially optimal fee fp if price and quality discrimination
are allowed. Because patients split evenly between physi-
cians in the symmetric equilibrium independently from
f, the preference parameter t is not relevant for this ana-
lysis. Glazer and McGuire consider a social surplus
function where the price p as a pure transfer from
patients to physicians does not enter. Concerning effi-
ciency, only quality hence remains crucial and total wel-
fare with price discrimination can be written as
Wp =
∫ 1
0
[v(s(t)) − s(t)]dt − θ f . (11)
Here, v(s) - s measures the net social gain of quality s
per unit of service. θf corresponds to the social cost of
Medicare, where θ > 0 indicates positive administrative
costs.
The net social gain vanishes for s = 0 and is negative
for all other values of s due to v(0) = 0, v’(0) = 1 and
the concavity of v. In a first-best world, the fee f would
therefore be chosen such that s = 0 for all patients. This
level is denoted by f*. By equation (9), we obtain f* = 1/
2 + c.
With positive social cost θf, Glazer and McGuire iden-
tify a trade-off between quality and distortion costs if
Medicare cannot dictate the level of quality and set s =
0 and f = 0 at the same time. Using equation (10), they
show that the second-best optimal fee is fp < f*, imply-
ing s(fp) > 0, i.e., the second-best quality received by the
fee-only patients is lower than that of the price-paying
patients.
Glazer and McGuire compare the welfare level under
price and quality discrimination and fee policy fp with
the situation where discrimination is prohibited. As
shown in the preceding section, total demand of physi-
cian i then consists only of fee-only patients whose
number is t∗i = (1 − si + sj)/2. Consequently, profit is πi
(si, sj) = (f - c + v(si))(1 - si + sj)/2 with the first-order
condition for a maximum dπi/dsi = v’(si)(1 + sj - si)/2 -
(f - c + v(si))/2 = 0, which simplifies for the symmetric
Nash equilibrium with si = sj to
v′(s) − (f − c + v(s)) = 0. (12)
In the equilibrium without discrimination, social wel-
fare is
Wo(f ) = v(s(f )) − s(f ) − θ f
since all patients get the same quality s(f) determined
by (12) and the total number of patients is one. The
optimal fee fo under this regime hence is defined as arg-
max f W
o(f) and solves
∂Wo
∂f
= (v′(s(f o)) − 1) ds
df
− θ = 0. (13)
Differentiating (12) yields ds/df = 1/(v″(s) - v’(s)) < 0.
The optimality condition (13) hence can only be satis-
fied for θ > 0 if v’(s(fo)) < 1. This implies s(fo) > 0
because v’(0) = 1 and v″ < 0. Hence, if balance-billing is
not allowed and Medicare pays the optimal fee fo all
patients receive a service of suboptimal quality com-
pared to the first-best. Glazer and McGuire are able to
show that welfare with no discrimination and the opti-
mal fee fo is always lower than welfare resulting from
the equilibrium with price and quality discrimination
and the optimal fee fp if θ > 0.(endnote e)
4 The optimal fee under balance billing
Glazer and McGuire are not explicit about how low the
second-best optimal fee fp that maximizes the welfare
function (11) is if balance-billing is allowed. Notably,
they do not raise the question whether Medicare should
pay any positive fee and, if so, whether the fee should
be such that there are any fee-only patients. In the fol-
lowing, we therefore investigate how social surplus
changes if Medicare reduces the fee or completely with-
draws from the physician market.
In the preceding section, the number of fee-only
patients of physician i has been shown to be
tˆi = (pi − si)/2 (equation (3)). In the symmetric Nash
equilibrium, we obtain from the first-order condition (7)
that p = (1 + s + v(s))/2, thus substitution yields
tˆi = (1 − s + v(s))/4. Consequently, the total number of
fee-only patients in the market is
tˆ =
1 + v(s) − s
2
(14)
where v(s) - s ≤ 0 is the net social gain from quality,
which is decreasing in s for s > 0 because of the concav-
ity of v. It is useful to define the level of quality s¯ > 0 at
which the number of fee-only patients in (14) becomes
zero:
1 + v(s¯) − s¯ = 0 (15)
Hence, s¯ is the upper bound of s (a lower bound of
quality) such that there are still some fee-only patients
in equilibrium. Equation (10) implies that Medicare can
always ensure that s increases to s¯ and hence the num-
ber of fee-only patients vanishes by sufficiently decreas-
ing the fee down to f . The level of f can be
characterized using the equilibrium condition (9):
f − c = v′(s¯)1 + v(s¯) − s¯
2
− v(s¯) ⇒ f = c − v(s¯) ≥ 0, (16)
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where the definition of s¯ in (15) has been used. f is
thus just as high as the service costs per patient if qual-
ity is reduced to its lower bound.
When characterizing the optimal fee under balance
billing, Glazer and McGuire restrict themselves to the
range between f and f* which they define as the ‘nor-
mal’ range of fee policy.(endnote f) It involves a co-exis-
tence of price-paying and fee-only patients where the
latter receive a service of suboptimal quality. In the fol-
lowing, we first stick to this convention and show in
Proposition 1 that f is always the optimal fee in this
range. Subsequently, we allow a fee policy on the inter-
val [0,∞), i.e., Medicare may completely withdraw from
the physician market, and characterize the optimal fee
under this regime (Proposition 2).
What is the social surplus if the fee is reduced to f ?
Because of tˆ = p − s = 0, the symmetric equilibrium
involves a price p = s¯ and all patients become price-
payers if U¯ − s¯ − 1/2 ≥ 0 is satisfied, i.e., if the willing-
ness to pay U¯ is sufficiently high.(endnote g) Clearly, all
patients then get the socially optimal quality. In order to
examine whether this is a welfare optimum, consider
the welfare function for the case of price and quality
discrimination. It only depends on the quality provided
to the fee-only patients. Using (14), it can be written as
follows:
Wp(f ) = (v(s(f )) − s(f ))tˆ(s(f )) − θ f = (v(s(f )) − s(f ))1 + v(s(f )) − s(f )
2
− θ f , (17)
where s depends on f through equation (9). Social sur-
plus is calculated by multiplying per capita net social
value of quality with the number of fee-only patients in
equilibrium and subtracting the distortion costs of the
fee.
Proposition 1: If the payer is confined to the normal
range of fee policy, i.e. f ∈ [f ; f ∗], and patients’ will-
ingness to pay is sufficiently high, then the global wel-
fare maximum is implemented by setting f = f for all
values of θ > 0.
Proof: We have
dWp
df
= (v′(s) − 1) ds
df
(
1
2
+ v(s) − s
)
− θ .
Evidently, if θ is sufficiently high, then this difference
is always negative, and welfare is maximized by setting
the lowest possible fee, which is f . Since this makes the
number of fee-only patients in (17) vanish, it induces a
welfare level of −θ f . Otherwise, there exists a local max-
imum such that
(v′(s) − 1) ds
df︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(
1
2
+ v(s) − s
)
= θ .
(18)
Being confined to f ≤ f*, we always deal with s ≥ 0.
Hence, by (10), the first two factors at the left-hand side
of (18) are both negative. For (18) to be satisfied, 1/2 +
v(s) - s > 0 is therefore required, which implies s < s¯ by
(15) and thus f > f . If it exists, the local maximum is
therefore in the interval [f ; f ∗] indeed.(endnote h) But as
the first term of the welfare function (17), (v(s) − s)tˆ(s),
can be at most zero due to v(s) - s ≤0 and tˆ ≥ 0, any fee
higher than f must be associated with a welfare level
lower than −θ f . Hence, even if there exists a local maxi-
mum of Wp(f) for f > f , the global welfare maximum in
the interval [f ; f ∗] is reached at the fee f . □
The intuition of Proposition 1 can be explained by
considering the first-best welfare function
W∗(f ) = (v(s(f )) − s(f ))tˆ(s(f )). It reaches its maximum
W* = 0 for two values of f. As shown in the preceding
subsection, by choosing the first-best fee level f*, quality
becomes s(f*) = 0 and hence v(s(f*)) - s(f*) = 0. Now, a
second possibility to raise the quality component of the
welfare function up to zero has been established. This
can be achieved by reducing the fee to f implying tˆ = 0.
It is irrelevant that quality for fee-only patients is mini-
mal under this policy as no patient is affected by it and
we are left only with the distortion costs θ f regarding
efficiency. Any higher fee with tˆ > 0 and s ≤ 0 results in
a lower social surplus. In terms of the welfare function
(11), Medicare should never pay a fee higher than f .
Obviously, welfare may be further increased by redu-
cing the fee from f to zero as this eliminates the distor-
tion costs. However, such a comparison is only valid if
all patients continue to be served. We are going to
derive the conditions that ensure this in the proof of the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: If the payer can set any fee f Î [0;∞)
and patients’ willingness to pay is sufficiently high,
then the first-best welfare optimum W* = Wp = 0
can be implemented by setting f = 0 under balance
billing.
Proof: For f < f , there are no fee-only patients. The
market demand faced by physician i is consequently
determined by the indifferent price-payer who satisfies
U¯ − t∗i − pi = U¯ − (1 − t∗i ) − pj. The number of price-
paying patients served by i is therefore
t∗i = (1 − pi + pj)/2 and her profit πi = (pi + f - c)(1 - pi
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+ pj)/2 with the first-order condition for a Nash equili-
brium 1 - pj - 2pi + c - f = 0. Using symmetry, we can
solve for the equilibrium price
p = 1 + c − f . (19)
If U¯ − (1 + c) − 1/2 ≥ 0, all patients are served if f is
set to zero.(endnote i) Under this condition, the global
welfare optimum W* = Wp = 0 is therefore attained by
setting f = 0.□
This establishes that even in the second-best world
with θ > 0, first-best efficiency is implementable by the
complete withdrawal of Medicare from the physician
market. Provided that the willingness to pay is suffi-
ciently high, all patients then become price-payers and
receive the optimal quality while there are no distortion
costs so that the surplus function used by Glazer and
McGuire becomes maximal. A further implication of
Proposition 2 is that ‘payer fee discrimination’, an alter-
native fee policy proposed by Glazer and McGuire
which discriminates the Medicare fee between fee-only
and price-paying patients, cannot further improve effi-
ciency.(endnote j)
Figure 2 illustrates the shape of the welfare function
(17). The graph of Wp (f) is constructed as the differ-
ence between the first-best welfare W*(f) = (v(s(f)) - s(f))
(1 + v(s) - s(f))/2 and the distortion costs θf. W* has a
corner maximum on the interval f ∈ [0; f ] with W*(f) =
0 as well as an interior maximum for f = f* with W*(f*)
= 0.(endnote k) Subtracting θf, we are left with a corner
maximum for f = 0 with Wp(0) = 0 and a local maxi-
mum for fp to the left of f* with Wp(fp) < 0.(endnote l)
The welfare considerations of Glazer and McGuire are
based on the existence of both fee-only patients and
price-payers, as it is associated with the fee fp > 0. How-
ever, this is only a local, not the global second-best
optimum.
The central result obtained by Glazer and McGuire
must therefore be strengthened: moving from an equili-
brium without balance-billing and optimal fee fo to an
equilibrium with balance-billing and optimal fee f = 0,
not only a welfare improvement but the first-best opti-
mum can be attained. As we show in the following sec-
tion, however, this result depends crucially on the
welfare function (11) which only takes into account the
efficiency of quality but does not consider any distribu-
tional effects. From the patients’ perspective, a Medicare
fee in the ‘normal range’ [f ; f ∗] can be optimal.
5 Balance billing and patient welfare
An important aspect with respect to balance billing is
how patients are affected by this policy. In particular,
there is the concern that patients are made worse off if
physicians are allowed to charge an additional price. In
the models by Paringer, Mitchell and Cromwell as well
as Zuckerman and Holahan which do not consider
effects on quality, this can lead to the drastic effect that
balance billing only raises the physician’s rent [2-4]. An
open question is the effect on patient welfare within the
model by Glazer and McGuire. Is the positive effect of
balance billing on quality dominant or are the quality
gains transformed into higher rents for physicians? In
this section, we take the patients’ point of view and try
to answer this question. Before we ask in Section 5.2
whether balance billing should be allowed, we first
determine in Section 5.1 the optimal Medicare fee if bal-
ance billing is allowed. Finally, we consider the effects of
‘fee discrimination’, a policy proposed by Glazer and
McGuire, on patient welfare in Section 5.3.
5.1 Should Medicare set a positive fee under balance
billing?
To assess the effects of Medicare’s policy on patient
welfare, we need to specify in more detail how Medi-
care’s expenditures are financed. In the following, we
assume that the government collects a uniform contri-
bution (1 + θ)f from each individual where f is the fee
paid to physicians and θf are the administrative costs of
Medicare per capita. Hence, the utility for fee-only
patients is given by U = U¯ − t − s − (1 + θ)f while price-
paying patients obtain utility Up = U¯ − t − p − (1 + θ)f .
If Medicare sets a fee f above f , then
t˜ =
1 − p + s
2
<
1
2
⇔ p > s. (20)


0 f

















θ f
f
f p
f ∗
W ∗( f )
W p( f )
Figure 2 Second-Best Welfare and Medicare payments f.
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Thus, patients who are treated at the fee only face a
lower quality reduction than the price charged from
price-paying patients. This is illustrated in Figure 3
which is based on the cost savings function
v(s) = − exp (−as − ln(a)) + a−1 (21)
where we set a = 1. It shows the utility distribution
for f = 0 and for a fee f˜ > f . Price-paying patients are
worse off and fee-only patients are better off for f˜ > f
compared to f = 0.
We measure patient welfare by the sum of utility of all
patients.(endnote m) As we show in Appendix A.1,
patient welfare under balance billing PWp then corre-
sponds to
PWp(f ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
U¯ − 1
4
− (1 + c) − θ f if 0 ≤ f < f
U¯ − 1
4
− p(f ) + (s(f ) − p(f ))2 − (1 + θ)f if f ≥ f . (22)
Increasing Medicare’s fee therefore lowers patient wel-
fare if f ∈ [0; f ) provided that θ > 0. In this range, all
patients are balance billed and raising f reduces the
price p to the same extent since p = 1 + c - f by equa-
tion (19). The net effect is therefore a fall in utility by
higher administrative costs. To see whether a positive
fee can increase patient welfare we can therefore limit
ourselves to the case in which f ≥ f− and analyze the fol-
lowing difference
PWp(f ≥ f ) − PWp(f = 0) = h(f , θ) + (s(f ) − p(f ))2
where
h(f , θ) ≡ 1 + c − p(f ) − (1 + θ)f . (23)
If PWp(f ≥ f ) − PWp(f = 0) > 0, a positive Medicare
fee raises patient welfare. Note that a positive value of
the function h(f, θ) is sufficient for this result since (s(f)
- p(f))2 is nonnegative.
By equations (7) and (19) we obtain for the price for
balance-billed patients
p(f ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 + c − f if 0 ≤ f < f
1 + s(f ) + v(s(f ))
2
if f ≥ f .
This yields h(f, θ) = 0 for θ = 0 and f < f . For θ = 0
and f ≥ f−, we obtain
h(f , θ) = 1 + c − 1 + s(f ) + v(s(f ))
2
− f .
In Appendix A.2 we show that h(f) is increasing in f at
f = f if θ = 0. Thus, without administrative costs,
increasing f beyond f implies 1 + c > p(f) + (1 + θ) f
and patient welfare increases. Noting that
∂h(f , θ)
∂θ
= −f < 0,
this result continues to hold as long as θ is below a
critical value θˆPW. Furthermore, a positive value of h(f,
θ) for f > f is equivalent to
p(f ) + (1 + θ)f < 1 + c = p(f = 0).
Thus, for small values of θ even price-paying patients
are better off if f is raised above f . Since by (20) fee-
only patients face a lower quality reduction than the
price charged from price-paying patients, all patients
must therefore be better off. This is shown in Figure 4
which relies on the same parameters as Figure 3 except
θ which is 10% instead of 20%.(endnote n)
We summarize our results in
Proposition 3: Under balance-billing setting,
f > f increases patient welfare if Medicare’s adminis-
trative cost markup θ is smaller than a critical value
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f = 0 f˜ > f
U
t
Figure 3 Utility distribution for f = 0 and f˜>f (U¯=10, c = 2, a
= 1, θ = 20%, f˜=1.59, f=1.16).
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Figure 4 Utility distribution for f = 0 and f > f (U¯=10, c = 2,
a = 1, θ = 10%, f˜=1.67, f=1.16).
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f=1.16. Even all patients can be better off if θ is suf-
ficiently small.
Table 1 shows the results for a numerical simulation
with the cost savings function (21) for a = 1. Patient
welfare if the Medicare fee is zero is given by PWp(f =
0). For different values of θ, the Medicare fee f˜ ∗ which
maximizes patient welfare is calculated conditional on
PWp(f˜ ∗). PWp(f˜ ∗) is the corresponding patient welfare.
The simulation shows that
• for θ = 0% or 10%, we have
1 + c > p(f˜ ∗) + (1 + θ)f˜ ∗. Thus, all patients are better
off by setting the fee above f .
• for θ = 0% to 20%, we have
PWp(f˜ ∗) > PWp(f = 0), i.e., patient welfare is higher
for a fee above f . The critical value is θˆPW = 21.5%.
Our result is in stark contrast to the social surplus
analysis in section 4 where f = 0 is the optimal fee level.
In particular, setting the Medicare fee above f implies
that some patients receive suboptimal quality. However,
the decrease of average quality is not the only effect of
an increase in Medicare’s fee. Furthermore, profits of
physicians are affected. Denoting aggregate profits by Π,
we show in Appendix A.3 that the following relation
holds
− d
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
>
dPWp(θ = 0)
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
> 0, (24)
i.e., the decrease in physicians’s profits is larger than
the increase in patient welfare. For our numerical simu-
lation with θ = 10%, Figure 5 shows how patient welfare
increases even though social surplus falls. Patients are
better off even though quality provision is less efficient
on average.
This result can be explained by the effects of Medi-
care’s policy on physician competition. By raising f,
competition for patients gets more intense and profits
of physicians fall by more than the decrease in average
quality. Especially patients in the middle get a better
deal as physicians are willing to treat them at the fee-
only. Although they receive lower quality, they get a
more favorable offer than price-paying patients as p > s.
In addition, price-paying patients may also be better off
if Medicare’s administrative cost markup θ is sufficiently
small.
5.2 Should balance billing be allowed?
One of the central findings of Glazer and McGuire is
that social surplus is generally higher if balance billing is
allowed. However, balance billing also gives physicians
the opportunity to increase their profits. It is therefore
unclear whether patients also benefit if balance billing is
permitted. We investigate this issue by taking a regime
without balance billing and fo, the corresponding opti-
mal fee from an efficiency perspective, as a reference
point (see equation (13)). The corresponding quality
level so(fo) is defined by equation (12), leading to patient
welfare
PWo(f o) = U¯ − 1
4
− so(f o) − (1 + θ)f o. (25)
Turning to a comparable regime with balance billing,
we define fˆ p as the solution to sp(fˆ p) = so, i.e., the value
of fp which leads to the same quality under balance bill-
ing. From equation (9) which holds in the symmetric
equilibrium with balance billing, we can infer that
fˆ p = v′(so)
1 + v(so) − so
2
− v(so) + c. (26)
First, we assume that fˆ p > f . If balance billing is pro-
hibited, then equation (12) holds in equilibrium which
implies fo = -v(so) + c + v’(so). Inserting in (26) leads to
f o − fˆ p = v′(so)1 + s
o − v(so)
2
> 0
Table 1 Patient welfare under balance billing U¯=10, c =
2, a = 1
θ f˜
∗
for f > f p(f˜
∗
)+(1+θ)f˜
∗ 1 + c PWp(f˜
∗
) PW
p(f = 0)
0% 1.86 2.82 3 7.13 6.75
10% 1.75 2.98 3 6.95 6.75
20% 1.66 3.13 3 6.78 6.75
30% 1.59 3.27 3 6.61 6.75
40% 1.52 3.40 3 6.46 6.75
50% 1.47 3.54 3 6.31 6.75
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Figure 5 Patient welfare and profits as a function of f,
θ = 10%.
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since so - v(so) ≥ 0 is implied by v(0) = 0,v’(0) = 1, v’(s)
> 0 and v″(s) < 0. Thus, under balance billing the same
quality for fee-only patients can be provided with a
lower Medicare fee.
For patient welfare under balance billing (see equation
(22)), we obtain
PWp(fˆ p > f ) = U¯ − 1
4
− p(fˆ p) +
(
so − p(fˆ p)
)2 − (1 + θ)fˆ p.
Using (25) yields for the difference of total utilities
under the two regimes
PWp(fˆ p > f ) − PWo(f o) = (so − p(fˆ p)) +
(
so − p(fˆ p)
)2
+ (1 + θ)(f o − fˆ p). (27)
The first term is negative since s > p for fˆ p > f (see
equation (20)), the second term is nonnegative, the third
term strictly positive. Thus, this difference is positive for
any value of so if θ is sufficiently large. Allowing balance
billing is then superior from the patients’ perspective. It
can always replicate the level of quality at a lower cost
which is sufficient to increase patient welfare.
Next, we turn to the case fˆ p ≤ f . In this case, the best
choice under balance billing is to set fp = 0 as there are
only price-paying patients. This yields p = 1 + c and
PWp(f p = 0) − PWo(f o) = −(1 + c) − so(f o) − (1 + θ)f o.
Again if θ is sufficiently large, then average utility
increases when balance billing is allowed.(endnote o)
We can therefore conclude in
Proposition 4: For a given fee level fo without bal-
ance billing, patient welfare can be increased by
allowing balance billing if Medicare’s administrative
cost markup θ is sufficiently large.
Proposition 4 shows the main drawback of prohibiting
balance billing. Inducing quality without balance billing
is very costly if Medicare’s administrative costs are high.
Permitting balance billing allows to induce the same
quality at a lower Medicare fee. The corresponding sav-
ings in administrative costs can exceed higher payments
to physicians from patients who are balance billed.
In assessing Proposition 4, however, one has to keep
in mind that neither fo nor fˆ p are chosen optimally, i.
e., maximize patient welfare for each regime. With
respect to the regime without balance billing, this
opens the possibility that fo is not the optimal choice
for values of θ which allow higher patient welfare
under balance billing. On the other hand, under bal-
ance billing patient welfare is generally higher by set-
ting a fee different from fˆ p.
Numerical simulations based the cost savings function
(21) indicate that Proposition 4 can also be extended to
optimally chosen fee levels. An example is shown in
Table 2. For different values of θ, so* and fo* are the
optimal values without balance billing. Maximized
patient welfare without balance billing is denoted by
PWo(fo*). Besides fˆ p also the fee level f
p* which maxi-
mizes patient welfare with balance billing is given as
well as the corresponding total utilities PWp(fˆ p) and
PWp(fp*). If θ > 16.7%, then PWp(fˆ p) > PWo(f o∗) and
balance billing with the same quality for fee-only
patients is superior to an optimal regime without bal-
ance billing. For θ > 1.2%, PWp(f p*) > PWo(fo*), i.e., pro-
hibiting balance billing yields higher patient welfare only
for low values of administrative costs. Note that for θ =
10% and 20%, balance billing with a positive Medicare
fee in the ‘normal range’ [f ; f ∗] is optimal. For θ = 30%
and 40%, we have fp* = 0. In this case, all patients are
better off if balance billing is permitted.
It is also possible that allowing balance billing yields
higher patient welfare already for θ = 0. The shape of
the cost savings function v(s) is crucial for this result.
This is shown in Figure 6. Setting a = 2 in the cost sav-
ings function (21) yields the optimal values fo* = 2.00, fp*
= 1.92, PWo(fo*) = 7.201 and PWp(fp*) = 7.183 which
implies that prohibiting balance billing is superior from
the patients’ perspective (see Figure 6(b)). For a = 1,
however, we obtain f o* = 2.00, fp* = 1.86, PWo(fo*) =
7.057 and PWp(fp*) = 7.126. Figure 6(a) shows that
allowing balance billing is superior for all values of f if θ
= 0.
In sum, it depends on Medicare’s administrative costs
and the properties of the cost function whether allowing
balance billing raises patient welfare. In contrast to Gla-
zer and McGuire, we do not find that allowing balance
billing is generally superior. In their analysis, only qual-
ity effects matter and allowing balance billing is better
because it can always induce the same quality at a lower
cost. From the patients’ perspective, it also has to be
taken into account that physicians charge a price from
selected patients. This reduces patient welfare. As long
as θ is small and inducing quality without balance billing
is therefore not too costly, this profit effect may domi-
nate and prohibiting balance billing leads to higher
patient welfare. For example, if a = 2 and θ = 0,
Table 2 Prohibiting vs.allowing balance billing U¯=10, c =
2, a = 1.75, f=1.47, f * = 1.91.
θ so* fo* fˆ
p
fp* PWo(fo*) PWp(fˆ
p
) PW
p(fp*)
0% 0.58 2.00 1.78 1.91 7.172 7.154 7.171
10% 0.63 1.95 1.74 1.85 6.975 6.967 6.983
20% 0.69 1.90 1.71 1.81 6.782 6.786 6.800
30% 0.73 1.87 1.68 0 6.593 6.607 6.750
40% 0.77 1.84 1.66 0 6.408 6.433 6.750
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aggregate profits are Πo(fo*) = 0.333 and Πp(f p*) = 0.513.
But higher profits do not necessarily imply lower patient
welfare. For a = 1 and θ = 0, the corresponding values
are Πo(fo*) = 0.5 and Πp(fp*) = 0.574. Nevertheless,
patient welfare is higher as the Medicare fee is lower
(1.86 vs. 2.00) and the quality reduction for fee-only
patients is significantly smaller (0.52 vs. 0.69) under bal-
ance billing.
5.3 Fee discrimination
Glazer and McGuire also analyze a regime of balance
billing under which Medicare discriminates the fee
depending on whether the physician treats patients at
the fee only or balance bills them. Under this policy,
physicians are reimbursed f + d if they do not charge
their patients price p and f - d if they do, with d > 0.
Glazer and McGuire argue that such a fee policy is wel-
fare improving based on the efficiency criterion if the
extent of discrimination as measured by d is small and
if the fee is set close to its optimum.(endnote p) How-
ever, as already mentioned in Section 4, Proposition 2
implies that the first-best welfare level can be imple-
mented by Medicare withdrawing form the market, rul-
ing out any strictly positive efficiency effect of fee
discrimination. The question remains to be answered
whether fee discrimination can be justified if Medicare
is assumed to be concerned about patient welfare.
We first derive the equilibrium price under fee discri-
mination. Since the payer increases the fee by d > 0 for
the treatment of fee-only patients and reduces it by the
same amount in the other cases, physician i’s profit
becomes
π i = (f − d + pi − c)
1 − pi + sj
2
+ (f + d − c + v(si))pi − si2
with the first-order conditions for a Nash-equilibrium
1 − pi + sj
2
− f − d + pi − c
2
+
f + d − c + v(si)
2
= 0 (28)
− f + d − c + v(si)
2
+ v′(si)
pi − si
2
= 0. (29)
Assuming symmetry, (28) can be solved for the equili-
brium price under fee discrimination
p(d) =
1 + s(d) + v(s(d))
2
+ d. (30)
Thus, two effects result from the introduction of fee
discrimination by d on the price physicians charge. First,
a direct effect implies that physicians increase the price
just by d to compensate for the lower fee that they
receive for the treatment of price-paying patients. Note
that this is a difference to variations in f where no such
direct effect on the price exists. Second, an indirect
effect on p works through the influence of d on the
equilibrium level of quality. By substituting (30) into
(29) for the symmetric case and differentiating, we can
determine this effect of d on quality as follows
ds
dd
=
2
v′′(s)(1 − s + 2d + v(s)) − 3v′(s) + (v′(s))2 (1 − v
′(s)).(31)
Hence, (31) is similar to ds/df in (10) with one differ-
ence. In contrast to (10), the sign of (31) now depends
on the volume of the marginal cost savings from
reduced quality v’(s). This results from the direct effect
of d on the price found in (30). If marginal cost savings
are high (v’(s) > 1 ⇔ s < 0), then quality is decreased in
response to a marginal increase in d and the price is
increased more than proportionally. This can be seen
from differentiating (30)
dp
dd
=
1 + v′(s)
2
ds
dd
+ 1.
Otherwise, due to (10) and (31), physicians react to an
increase in the amount of fee discrimination by an
enhanced quality and a less than compensating price
increase. In this case, a marginal increase in d is similar
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(a) Cost savings function v(s) with a = 1
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(b) Cost savings function v(s) with a = 2
Figure 6 Patient welfare as a function of f, θ = 0.
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to an increase of the fee f which induces physicians to
offer a better quality and decrease the price.
Given this information, we are able to compute the
total number of fee-only patients
2tˆ = p − s(d) = 1 − s(d) + 2d + v(s(d))
2
and of price-paying patients in the market with fee
discrimination
2t˜ =
1 + s(d) − 2d − v(s(d))
2
. (32)
In the absence of fee discrimination (d = 0), we have
2t˜ ≥ 1/2 due to s - v(s) ≥ 0 meaning that we always
observe more price payers than fee-only patients in the
market except for s = 0 where their numbers are just
equal. Introducing fee discrimination, however,
decreases the number of price paying patients. Indeed,
differentiating (32) yields
dt˜
dd
=
1
2
(
1 − v′(s)
2
ds
dd
− 1
)
,
which is unambiguously negative. Intuitively, fee dis-
crimination with d > 0 makes fee-only patients more
attractive to physicians. Therefore, their number rises in
equilibrium.
These expressions allow us to compare patient welfare
with fee discrimination (FD) and without fee discrimina-
tion (NFD) under balance billing. Assuming f ≥ f− we
show in Appendix A.4 that the change in patient welfare
induced by fee discrimination is
PW = PWFD − PWNFD
=
1 + s − v(s)
2
1 − s + v(s)
2
− 1 + s(d) − 2d − v(s(d))
2
× 1 − s(d) + 2d + v(s(d))
2
+ s − s(d) − (1 + θ)d(2d + v(s(d)) − s(d)).
(33)
Clearly, this is zero for d = 0 and differentiation yields
after some rearrangements
dPW
dd
|d=0 = − dsdd |d=0 +
1 − v′(s)
2
ds
dd
|d=0(s − v(s)) + θ(s − v(s)). (34)
Based on this equation, we prove the following in
Appendix A.5.
Proposition 5: A small amount of payer fee discri-
mination increases patient welfare if either
• θ is sufficiently high, or
• the fee is chosen so as to maximize patient wel-
fare and this results in s > 0.
Under these circumstances, Medicare paying a higher
fee to physicians who renounce on balance billing can
indeed be justified from the perspective of the patients.
However, it cannot be excluded that fee discrimination
lowers patient welfare. This may occur whenever the
price increase for the price payers dominates the quality
increase for the fee-only patients or if the fee is set so
that s < 0, which implies that fee discrimination actually
lowers quality.
6 Conclusions
This paper has revisited the economics of ‘balance bill-
ing’ in the framework by Glazer and McGuire [1]. We
analyzed the optimal Medicare policy from the perspec-
tive of patients and showed that a positive Medicare fee
and a mixed system with price-paying and fee-only
patients can increase patient welfare under balance bill-
ing if the administrative costs of Medicare are suffi-
ciently low. The intuition for this result is that a
positive Medicare fee increases competition of physi-
cians which lowers the total payment to physicians by
Medicare and patients.
Furthermore, we examined the case for permitting
balance billing. We showed that it depends on Medi-
care’s administrative costs and the properties of the phy-
sicians’ cost function whether allowing balance billing
raises patient welfare. In contrast to Glazer and
McGuire, we do not find that allowing balance billing is
generally superior as balance billing allows physicians to
increase their rents. However, both physicians’ rents and
patient welfare can be higher if balance billing is per-
mitted. This is the case for sufficiently high administra-
tive costs of Medicare. For some cost functions, patient
welfare can be higher under balance billing even in the
absence of administrative costs.
Finally, we considered the effects on patient welfare if
Medicare discriminates the fee depending on whether
the physician treats patients at the fee only or balance
bills them. This policy can also help to raise patient wel-
fare. This is the case if Medicare’s administrative costs
are high or if Medicare’s optimal fee under balance bill-
ing implies lower quality for fee-only patients.
Our study relied on a model based on profit-maximiz-
ing physicians. It may be interesting to relax this
assumption in future research. Altruistic physicians may
be less inclined to provide lower quality to fee-only
patients. Furthermore, we assumed symmetric informa-
tion about the quality of physicians’ services. To the
extent that patients cannot judge the quality of services,
the efficiency of balance billing may be questionable.
Balance-billed patients may only receive non-medical
amenities such as shorter waiting times for non-urgent
treatments. An interesting extension is also to allow
patients to differ in ability to pay.
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Appendix
A.1 Patient welfare under balance billing
For f < f , patient welfare is given by
PWp(f ) = 2
∫ 1/2
0
U¯ − t − p − (1 + θ)fdt
= U¯ − 1
4
− (1 + c) − θ f
as p = 1 + c - f in this case. If f ≥ f−, we obtain
PWp(f ) = 2
{∫ t˜(f )
0
U¯ − t − p(f ) − (1 + θ)fdt +
∫ 1/2
t˜(f )
U¯ − t − s(f ) − (1 + θ)fdt
}
= U¯ − 1
4
+ 2t˜(f )
(
s(f ) − p(f ))− s(f ) − (1 + θ)f .
Using t˜(f ) = (1 − p + s)/2 according to (1), this simpli-
fies to
PWp(f ) = U¯ − 1
4
− p(f ) + (s(f ) − p(f ))2 − (1 + θ)f .
Thus, patient welfare is
PWp(f ) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
U¯ − 1
4
− (1 + c) − θ f if 0 ≤ f < f
U¯ − 1
4
− p(f ) + (s(f ) − p(f ))2 − (1 + θ)f if f ≥ f . (A22)
A.2 Properties of the function h(f)
In the following, we show that the function
h(f , θ) ≡ 1 + c − p(f ) − (1 + θ)f . (A23)
is increasing in f at f = f if θ = 0. We have
∂h(f , θ = 0)
∂f
= −
1 + v′(s(f ))
2
ds
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
− 1.
At f = f ⇒ s = s¯ and therefore 1 + v(s¯) = s¯. From equa-
tion (10), we obtain
ds
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
=
2
(v′(s¯))2 − 3v′(s¯)
and therefore
∂h(f , θ = 0)
∂f
=
1 + v′(s¯)
3v′(s¯) − (v′(s¯))2 − 1.
Since s¯ > 0, we have v′(s¯) < 1. Furthermore, we must
have
1 + v′(s¯)
3v′(s¯) − (v′(s¯))2 > 1
as the function g(a) = (1 + a)/(3a - a2) has the follow-
ing properties: g(1) = 1 and g’(a) = (a2 + 2a - 3)(3a -
a2)-2 < 0 for 0 ≤ a < 1. Thus, g(a) > 1 for 0 ≤ a < 1 and
∂h(f , θ = 0)
∂f
= −
1 + v′(s(f ))
2
ds
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
− 1 > 0. (A:1)
If θ = 0, increasing f beyond f therefore implies 1 + c
> p(f) + (1 + θ) f and all patients are better off. Noting
that
∂h(f , θ)
∂θ
= −f < 0,
this result continues to hold as long as θ is below a
critical value θˆALL.
A.3 Physicians’ profits under balance billing
Aggregate profits are given by (cf. (4))
 = 2((p + f − c)t˜ + (f − c + v(s))(0.5 − t˜))
= 2pt˜ + v(s) (1 − 2t˜) + f − c.
For f < f and therefore p = 1 + c - f and t˜ = 1/2, this
simplifies to Π = 1. For f ≥ f−, we obtain with
 = p(1 − p + s) + v(s) (p − s) + f − c
= (p − v(s)) (1 − p + s) + v(s) + f − c.:
 = p(1 − p + s) + v(s) (p − s) + f − c
= (p − v(s)) (1 − p + s) + v(s) + f − c.
Inserting p = (1 + s + v(s))/2 from (7) yields
 =
1 + s + v(s)
2
1 + s − v(s)
2
+ v(s)
1 − s + v(s)
2
+ f − c
=
(1 + s)2 − (v(s))2
4
+
2v(s) − 2sv(s) + 2(v(s))2
4
+ f − c
=
(1 + s)2 + (v(s))2
4
− 2v(s)(s − 1)
4
+ f − c
=
(
1 + s − v(s)
2
)2
+ v(s) + f − c.
Thus, we can summarize
(f ) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if 0 ≤ f < f(
1 + s − v(s)
2
)2
+ v(s) + f − c if f ≥ f .
For f ≥ f− we obtain
d
df
=
(
1 + s − v(s)) (1 − v′(s)) ds
df
+ v′(s)
ds
df
+ 1
=
(
1 + s − v(s) − v′(s)(s− v(s))) ds
df
+ 1.
At f = f , we have s¯ − v(s¯) = 1 and therefore
d
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
=
(
2 − v′(s¯)) ds
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
+ 1.
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Patient welfare for f ≥ f− is given by equation (22).
Using p = (1 + s + v(s))/2 from (7) yields
PWp(f ) = U¯ − 1
2
+
(s(f ) − v(s(f )))2
4
− s(f ) − (1 + θ)f
and therefore
dPWp
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
= −1 + v
′(s¯)
2
ds
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
− (1 + θ).
Equation (A.1) implies
dPWp(θ = 0)
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
= −1 + v
′(s¯)
2
ds
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
− 1 > 0.
Furthermore,
1 + v′(s¯)
2
< 2 − v′(s¯)
since v′(s¯) < 1. Thus,
− d
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
>
dPWp(θ = 0)
df
∣∣∣∣
f=f
> 0, (A24)
A.4 Patient welfare under fee discrimination
As we have shown in Appendix A.1, patient welfare
under balance billing without fee discrimination (NFD)
is
PWNFD(f > f ) = U¯ − 1/4 + 2t˜(s − p) − s − (1 + θ)f
for f > f (which by Proposition 3 holds in the opti-
mum if θ is sufficiently small) and if there is no fee dis-
crimination. Using p = (1 + s + v(s))/2 from (7) and
2t˜ = 1 − p + s = 1 + s − v(s)
2
from (1), this can be rewritten as
PWNFD(f > f ) = U¯ − 1/4 − 1 + s − v(s)
2
1 − s + v(s)
2
− s − (1 + θ)f .
Analogously, patient welfare under balance billing with
fee discrimination (FD) is given by
PWFD(f > f ) = U¯ − 1
4
− 1 + s(d) − 2d − v(s(d))
2
1 − s(d) + 2d + v(s(d))
2
− s(d) − (1 + θ) [2tˆ(f + d) + 2t˜(f − d)]
= U¯ − 1
4
− 1 + s(d) − 2d − v(s(d))
2
1 − s(d) + 2d + v(s(d))
2
− s(d) − (1 + θ) [f + d(2d + v(s(d)) − s(d))] .
Hence, the change in patient welfare ΔPW = PWFD -
PWNFD induced by fee discrimination is given by (33).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
The last term of equation
dPW
dd
|d=0 = − dsdd |d=0 +
1 − v′(s)
2
ds
dd
|d=0(s − v(s)) + θ(s − v(s)). (A34)
θ(s - v(s)) measures the effect of d on the distortion
costs. This term is unambiguously positive for s ≠ 0
because s - v(s) > 0 and increases with θ. Noting that
the first two terms on the right hand side of (34) do not
depend on θ, we can therefore conclude that a small
amount of payer fee discrimination increases patient
welfare if θ is sufficiently large, irrespective of the level
of f chosen originally.
The first two terms in (34) account for two further
effects of fee discrimination on patient welfare, namely
the induced change in price and quality. As was shown
above, if s < 0, then a marginal increase in d leads to a
higher price and a lower quality, which both lowers
patient welfare. The sign of the first two terms in (34) is
therefore negative in this case and counteracts the posi-
tive effect from the reduced distortion. By contrast, if s
> 0, we have ds/dd < 0 by (31), meaning that the fee-
only patients receive a higher quality. This has a positive
impact on patient welfare. For s > 0, the overall sign of
the first two terms in (34) is therefore ambiguous in
general since the price and quality effects work in oppo-
site directions. However, we can show that the positive
quality effect dominates if the fee is chosen so as to
maximize patient welfare. Assuming an interior opti-
mum, the first order condition is
dPWNFD
df
=
1 − v′(s)
2
(s− v(s)) ds
df
− ds
df
− (1 + θ) = 0. (A:2)
In addition, (31) implies
ds
dd
∣∣∣∣
d=0
= (1 − v′(s)) ds
df
.
Substituting into (A.2) yields
1
1 − v′(s)
(
1 − v′(s)
2
(s − v(s)) ds
dd
∣∣∣∣
d=0
− ds
dd
∣∣∣∣
d=0
− (1 − v′(s))(1 + θ)
)
= 0
or,
− ds
dd
∣∣∣∣
d=0
+
1 − v′(s)
2
(s − v(s)) ds
dd
∣∣∣∣
d=0
= (1 − v′(s)) (1 + θ) > 0 if s > 0.
This confirms that if the fee is chosen optimally and s >
0, then even the first two terms in (34) are positive in
sum and hence a small amount of payer fee discrimina-
tion increases patient welfare irrespective of the size of θ.
Endotes
Endnote a. McKnight provides a detailed history of the
legislation on balance billing [7].
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Endnote b. By assumption, there is no further price
discrimination among price-paying patients.
Endnote c. For quality competition to be effective, the
right-hand side of the equation must always be larger or
equal than zero, hence we need U¯ ≥ 1 − t˜i + sj.
Endnote d. This is a corrected version of the corre-
sponding equation (9) in [1].
Endnote e. See p. 251 in [1].
Endnote f. See Section 2.4 in [1].
Endnote g. To derive the demand functions, we
already needed the assumption that U¯ exceeds a certain
minimum value, which must be strengthened at this
point.
Endnote h. Note that
dWp/df (f ) = (v′(s¯) − 1) (1/2 + v(s¯) − s¯) ds/df − θ < 0
because 1 + v(s¯) − s¯ = 0 by (15). In addition, dWp/df (f*)
= -θ < 0. Hence, by continuity of Wp(f), if there is a
maximum in [f , f ∗], there must also be a minimum to
the left of the maximum satisfying (18).
Endnote i. Each physician makes a profit of πi = 1/2.
Endnote j. See Section 5.3 for a further evaluation of
fee discrimination.
Endnote k. By inspection of the first derivative ∂W*/∂f
= (v’(s) - 1)(1/2 + v(s) - s)ds/d f there exists a local mini-
mum for f˜ between f and f* satisfying
1/2 + v(s(f˜ )) − s(f˜ ) = 0.
Endnote l. As mentioned in the proof of Proposition
1, this local maximum of the second-best welfare func-
tion (as well as the minimum) may not exist if θ is very
high.
Endnote m. An alternative measure is the utility of
the worst-off patient. It can be shown that under bal-
ance billing with f > f this is the person located at t˜
(see Figure 3). Otherwise the person at t = 1/2 is worst-
off. For this welfare measure we obtain the same quali-
tative results.
Endnote n. For the critical value θˆALL, we must have
θˆALL ≤ θˆPW. This follows from equation (23): the condi-
tion for all patients to be better off is h(f, θ) > 0. For an
increase in patient welfare it is sufficient that h(f, θ)+(s
(f) - p(f))2 > 0.
Endnote o. Note that in this case all patients must be
better off if patient welfare is higher under balance bill-
ing: Under balance billing all patients pay price p = 1 +
c for quality s = 0 and therefore obtain utility
U¯ − t − (1 + c). Without balance billing utility from
Medicare is U¯ − t − so − (1 + θ)f o which is smaller than
1 + c if PWp(fp = 0) PWo(fo) > 0.
Endnote p. See the proposition on page 252 in [1].
Their claim is that efficiency rises if d is small and f
close to the second-best level f p in their framework.
However, in the proof, they refer to a situation where s
approaches zero, which is associated with f = f*.
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